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Abusive Tax Shelters, Legal Malpractice, and Revised
Formal Ethics Opinion 346: Does Revised 346
Enable Third Party Investors to Recover From
Tax Attorneys Who Violate Its Standards?
JosephJ. Portuondo*
No group of individuals ... can be permitted by adopting careless
and slipshod methods to save time, effort, or money, to set its own uncontrolled standardat the expense of the rest of the community. If the only test
is to be what has always been done, no one will ever have any great incentive to make any progress in the direction of safety. '

The organized bar has conceded that many attorneys issue tax
shelter opinions of questionable ethical standards. 2 Indeed, some
have remarked that "the perception.

. .

that sham and corner cut-

ting in the tax shelter area is an acceptable and customary part of
tax practice" poses a "threat to the profession." 3
Revised Formal Ethics Opinion 346 (Revised 346), 4 issued by
the American Bar Association (ABA) Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility onJanuary 29, 1982, is the organized bar's
repudiation of and answer to this improper practice. Revised 346
clearly articulates the committee's perception of what constitutes
appropriate conduct for lawyers working in the tax shelter opinion
area. 5
* Associate, Wood, Lucksinger & Epstein, Miami, Florida; B.A., 1977,J.D., 1980, University of Santa Clara; M.L.T., 1984, Georgetown University Law Center.
1 R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, LEGAL MALPRACTICE 339 n.8 (2d ed. 1981) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 295A comment c (1965)).
2 See, e.g., Report of the Exec. Comm. of the Tax Section, New York State Bar Ass'n,
The Treasury's ProposedAmendments to Circular230 and Standards Applicable to Tax Opinions Used
in Offering Tax Shelter Investments (Nov. 3, 1980); New York State Bar Ass'n Tax Section,
Report of the Tax Section Exec. Comm. on the Treasury: ProposedAmendment to Circular230 and
Standards Applicable to Tax Opinions Used in Offering Tax Shelter Investments, Part I, 53 N.Y. ST.
B.J. 202 (1981).
3 Ethics Ruling on Legal Opinionsin Tax Shelter Investment Offerings, 7 DEL. J. CORP. L. 449,
450 (1982).
4 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 346 (Revised
1982) [hereinafter cited as Revised 346]. See generally B. WOLFMAN & J. HOLDEN, ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE 173-200 (2d ed. 1985).
5 "[C]oncems have been expressed by the organized bar, regulatory agencies, and
others over the need to articulate ethical standards applicable to a lawyer who issues [a tax
shelter] opinion." Revised 346, supra note 4, at 1.
A responsibility of the committee is to express its opinion on proper professional conduct of lawyers and to do so by a formal opinion where the subject is of
widespread interest [citation omitted]. Accordingly, the committee expresses its
opinions as to the standard applicable to lawyers who issue tax shelter opinions.
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The ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Re6
sponsibility was faced with the threat of government regulation,
and frustrated by the undoubtedly unethical practices of attorneys
who provide opinions which promote abusive tax shelters. 7 Revised 346, the ABA response, sets forth appropriate professional
standards which lawyers should follow when rendering tax shelter
opinions. However, despite its issuance, and a warning that the
ABA will cooperate with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in referring violations to disciplinary agencies,8 attorneys continue to
participate in these abuses. 9
Although the use of ethical standards to achieve compliance
with the tax laws appears to be a relatively new concept, courts
often use ethical standards in measuring an attorney's liability for
legal malpractice. 10 Although investors have not yet employed Revised 346 to define an attorney's liability for legal malpractice when
their tax shelters fail, a strong argument for doing so exists.
This article examines the potential use of Revised 346 in these
cases. Part I reviews the background of the problem which
prompted the ABA's issuance of Revised 346,11 and Part II discusses the standards which Revised 346 sets. 12 Part III argues that
Revised 346 establishes that investors can sue as third party beneficiaries,' 3 or at least, that Revised 346 sets the applicable standards
in such suits. 14 Finally, Part IV details the elemental ramifications
Id. at 2.
[T]hese canons and ethical considerations constitute a body of principles
which provide guidance in the application of the lawyer's professional responsibility to specific situations, such as the rendering of tax shelter opinions.
Id. at 4.
6 See note 5 supra and notes 33-47 infra and accompanying text.
7 The term "tax shelter" is generally used to describe an investment which permits an
investor to benefit from a deduction or credit which operates to reduce or "shelter" taxable
income from other sources. An abusive tax shelter is one which purports to qualify for
legitimate tax benefits but which in fact does not qualify.
8 ABA Tax Section Rails Against Tax Shelters, 23 TAX NOTES 1018, 1019 (1984).
9 "Despite efforts by the ABA to use ABA Ethics Opinion 346 to discourage opinion
letters for abusive tax shelters, representatives from the IRS tax shelter program told the
[IRS Commissioner's] advisory group that the tax shelter promotions continue." IRS May
Work With Securities Agencies, ABA on Tax Shelters, 20 TAX NOTES 829 (1983). Although ABA
Ethics Opinion 346 requires that attorneys who write tax shelter opinion letters determine
if the tax shelter's appraiser is qualified and if the appraisal appears reasonable on its face,
it appears that many attorneys accept the appraisal that is provided to them, and thus the
substance of the tax shelter transaction has not changed. Id. See also note 45 infra.
10 See generally Dahlquist, The Code of Professional Responsibility and Civil Damage Actions
Against Attorneys, 9 OHro N.U.L. REV. 1 (1982); Gaudineer, Ethics and Malpractice, 26 DRAKE
L. REV. 88 (1976); Wolfram, The Code of ProfessionalResponsibility as a Measureof Attorney Liability in Civil Litigation, 30 S.C.L. REV. 281 (1979).
I1 See text accompanying notes 16-50 infra.
12 See text accompanying notes 51-82 infra.
13 See text accompanying notes 83-116 infra.
14 See text accompanying notes 117-42 infra.
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of Revised 346's applicability to legal malpractice cases.' 5
I.

The Nature of the Problem and Reaction
to Abusive Tax Shelter Practices

The IRS began attacking abusive tax shelters early in the
1970's and since then has continued to do so with ever increasing
intensity. Initially the IRS focused on the question of whether it
should recognize (for tax purposes) organizations constituted as
partnerships as such, or, whether it should classify such entities as
associations taxable as corporations, thereby eliminating the essential feature permitting the sheltering of income.' 6 These attacks began with the issuance of revenue procedures designed to create
artificial operating rules under which the IRS could deny advanced
revenue rulings to many tax shelter arrangements. 17 However, tax
practitioners uniformly recognized that the IRS could not support
its position in these revenue procedures and, consequently, they
routinely ignored them.' 8
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 succeeded, to some degree, in
curbing the use of abusive tax shelters by introducing "at risk"
rules, the capitalization requirement of construction period interest
and taxes, 19 and stricter rules regarding the use of special and retroactive partnership allocations. 20 The IRS continued its attack on
October 31, 1977, by issuing the famous "Halloween Massacre"
rulings. 2 ' These rulings presented an aggressive and expansive interpretation of the "at risk" rules. The Revenue Act of 1978 ex22
tended the "at risk" rules even further.
The IRS then shifted its strategy by questioning overvaluations. 2 3 In Rev. Rul. 77-110, the IRS held that if the amount of a
nonrecourse debt incurred to purchase property exceeded the
value of the property, then no amount of the debt could be in15 See text accompanying notes 143-81 infra.
16 See Schlenger, Comments on the Proposed Regulations on Tax Shelter Opinions, 59 TAXES
173, 173-74 (1981).
17 Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1982-1 C.B. 735; Rev. Proc. 74-17, 1974-1 C.B. 438.
18 Schlenger, supra note 16, at 174.
19 The Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, §§ 201, 204, 213, 90 Stat. 1520,
1525-27, 1531-33, 1547-49 (1976) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.);
see I.R.C. §§ 465, 189 (1976).
20 See Schlenger, supra note 16, at 175.
21 Rev. Rul. 77-305, 1977-2 C.B. 72; Rev. Ruls. 77-397 through 77-403, 1977-2 C.B.
178, 179, 200, 206, 215, 222, 302.
22 The Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 201, 92 Stat. 2763, 2814-16 (1978)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); see I.R.C. § 465 (1978).
23 Some abusive tax shelters have involved overvaluations between 200 and 400 percent. LeDuc, The Legislative Response of the 97th Congress to Tax Shelters, the Audit Lottey, and
Other Forms of Intentional or Reckless Noncompliance, 18 TAx NOTES 363, 371 (1983).
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cluded in basis. 24 This precluded the use of a number of abusive
tax shelters. The overvaluation fight continued in the "Saint Patrick's Day Massacre" of March 17, 1980, when the IRS issued several rulings concerning the permissibility of deductions, the
valuation of property contributed to charity, the classification of an
25
entity for tax purposes, sham transactions, and the "at risk" rules.
Again, the effect was a constriction of the abusive tax shelter
market.
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA)26 shut down
a large area of tax shelter activity by eliminating the very controver27
sial and unwarranted tax advantages of commodity straddles.
ERTA also introduced new penalties for income tax underpayments attributable to substantial valuation overstatements. 28 However, the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982
(TEFRA) 29 provided an even greater legislative effort to curb
abuses. TEFRA addressed the problem of abusive tax shelters and
the related audit lottery30 by imposing penalties on investors and
promoters, 3 1 and by providing courts with injunctive authority to
2
deal with repeat offenders.3
But these efforts to curb abuses were not successful in combatting the increasing problem of abusive tax shelters. OnJanuary 15,
1980, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue stated that the IRS
was investigating 200,000 individual income tax returns involving
approximately 18,000 tax shelter schemes and about $5 billion dollars in questionable deductions.3 3 The Commissioner further
24 Rev. Rul. 77-110, 1977-1 C.B. 58.
25 Rev. Ruls. 80-69 through 80-75, 1980-1 C.B. 55, 104, 106, 109, 128, 137, 314.
26 The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, §§ 501(a), 722(a), 95
Stat. 172, 323-26, 341-42 (1981) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
27 See I.R.C. § 1092 (1984).
28 See I.R.C. § 6659 (1984).
29 The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, §§ 320321, 96 Stat. 324, 611-12 (1982) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
30 The term "audit lottery" refers to the ability of a taxpayer to take undisclosed aggressive positions in his return with little fear of an audit and less fear of the imposition of
penalties because the IRS reviews relatively few tax returns and assesses even fewer
deficiencies.
31 See I.R.C. § 6700 (1984).
32 See I.R.C. § 7408 (1984). See generally Martin,Analysis of the Impact of the New Tax Legislation on the Use of Tax Shelters, 57 J. TAx'N 288 (1982). See also LeDuc, supra note 23, at 36989.
33 Kurtz, The State of Our Federal Tax System, S. CAL. L. CENTER THIRTY-SECOND ANNUAL
INST. ON FEDERAL TAX'N 17-9 (1980). This is a small percentage of the estimated $100
billion lost annually due to taxpayer noncompliance. LeDuc, supra note 23, at 370. However, the existence of abusive tax shelters involving outrageous contrivances reinforces the
popular belief in taxpayer inequality and tax law inequity. These perceptions lead to an
across the board decline in voluntary compliance with the tax laws. Sax, Lawyer Responsibility
in Tax Shelter Opinions, 34 TAx LAw. 5 (1980); Note, Ethics Ruling on Legal Opinions in Tax
Shelter Investment Offerings, 7 DEL. J. CORP. L. 449, 450 (1982). Taxpayer noncompliance
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stated that many abusive tax shelters depended upon the participation of tax attorneys for their successful marketing 3 4 and that the
IRS was exploring the "ethical and legal standards which should
govern" attorneys' conduct in these schemes.3 5 Only three days
later, the General Counsel of the Treasury Department echoed the
Treasury's concern regarding tax attorneys who "through their
opinions control access to the tax shelter marketplace." 3 6 The
General Counsel identified several types of opinions which were
considered "abusive": the false opinion,3 7 the assumed facts opinion, 38 the non-opinion,3 9 and the reasonable basis opinion. 40 He
warned that the Treasury Department would invoke its statutory
authority4 ' to discipline attorneys who pen abusive tax shelter opinions unless the organized bar accepted the responsibility of regulat42
ing the practice.
This warning became reality on September 3, 1980, when the
IRS issued proposed amendments to Circular 23043 setting forth
stricter standards of conduct for attorneys who provide tax shelter
leads to economic inefficiencies as well. The litigation explosion (and all the wasted resources such litigation involves) has penetrated the tax court. In April 1981 there were
36,246 cases pending before the tax court of which an estimated 2,500 to 3,000 were tax
shelter cases. Id. at 449. Recently, the tax court had approximately 57,000 cases pending
of which 20,000 were tax shelter cases. ABA Tax Section Rails Against Tax Shelters, supra note
8, at 1019.
34 Tax opinions play a crucial role in the promotion and marketing of tax shelters.
LeDuc, supra note 23, at 381; Sax, supra note 33, at 14-16; see ABA Section on Taxation,
Statement on Proposed Rule Amending Circular230 With Respect to Tax Shelter Opinions, 34 TAx
Law. 745 (1981). Tax opinions began to play this important role in tax avoidance in the
1950's. LeDuc, supra note 23, at 388. See also Brown, Advice of Tax Adviser as Insulation Against
Penalities, S. CAL. L. CENTER THIRD ANNUAL INST. ON FEDERAL TAx'N 497 (1951). Revised
346, supra note 4, at 1, explicitly recognizes that "the successful marketing of tax shelters
frequently involves tax opinions."
35 Kurtz, supra note 33, at 17-10.
36 Report by the Tax Section of the New York State Bar Ass'n, Circular230 and the
StandardsApplicable to Tax Shelter Opinions, 12 TAx NoTEs 251, 253 (1981) (quoting Robert H.
Mundheim, General Counsel of the Treasury Department, speaking at the Securities Regulation Institute on Jan. 18, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Mundheim].
37 A "false opinion" is one which omits serious legal risks and knowingly or recklessly
misstates facts or law. Mundheim, supra note 36, at 255.
38 An "assumed facts opinion" is one which relies upon underlying facts but disclaims
any knowledge of the accuracy of those facts. Mundheim, supra note 36, at 255-56.
39 A "non-opinion" discusses hypothetical facts and legal issues but never relates the
law to the actual facts. Mundheim, supra note 36, at 256.
40 A "reasonable basis opinion" states a reasonable basis for claiming tax benefits without predicting the outcome. In some instances, these opinions actually predict that the
taxpayer benefits will not materialize. Mundheim, supra note 36, at 256-58.
41 31 U.S.C. § 330 (1982 & Supp. 1985) (formerly 31 U.S.C. § 1026 (1976)).
42 Mundheim, supra note 36, at 259.
43 Treasury Dep't Circular No. 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Circular
230].
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opinions. 44 As amended, Circular 230 provided that the failure to
adhere to the announced standards could in some situations result
in suspension or disbarment from practicing before the IRS. 45 The
IRS reproposed these amendments (with modifications) on Decem47
ber 15, 1982,46 and on February 27, 1984, they were finalized.
The bar's initial reaction was unsurprisingly critical. 48 Accordingly, on June 1, 1981, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility responded by issuing Formal Ethics
Opinion 346, which details ethical conduct standards for attorneys
in the tax shelter area. 49 A number of groups suggested modifications, and on January 29, 1982, Revised 346 superseded Opinion
346.50

II. The Standards of Revised 346
A legal savant has been quoted as saying that "the lawyer obtains as much precise direction from his guide to professional responsibility as a heart surgeon could usefully derive from
examination of a valentine." 5 1 Indeed, most rules of ethics provide
little guidance because their language is too general, if not obtuse.
Atypically, Revised 346 contains rather specific standards 52 to guide
44 Prop. Regs. §§ 10.33, 10.51(j), 10.52, 45 Fed. Reg. 58,594 (1980) (codified at 31
C.F.R. §§ 10.33, 10.510), 10.52).
45 Commentators disagree about the effectiveness and severity of this punishment.
Some have remarked that violations of Circular 230 "will expose the person charged with a
most serious loss, the right to practice his profession before the I.R.S." Goldfein & Weiss,
An Analysis of the Proposed Changes Under Circular230 Affecting Tax Shelter Opinions, 53 J. TAx'N
340 (1980). However, another author persuasively argues that:
[io many lawyers who would write a tax shelter opinion the threat of discipline is
empty. Loss of the right to practice before the service is the forfeiture of the right
to participate in the letter rulings process and to represent taxpayers in administrative disputes. For most lawyers these rights have little practical significance.
Legal practices may develop that are devoted to giving tax shelter opinions free of
concern for discipline, because giving opinions does not constitute "practice
before" the service ....
Sax, supra note 33, at 45.
46 Prop. Regs. §§ 10.2(a), 10.7(c), 10.33, 10.51(j), 10.52, 10.76, 47 Fed. Reg. 56,144
(1982) (codified at 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.2(a), 10.7(c), 10.33, 10.51(0), 10.52, 10.76).
47 These regulations are effective for opinions issued after Feb. 23, 1984. 31 C.F.R.
§ 10 (1984). They also contain standards which are substantially similar to those of Revised
346. See notes 51-82 infra and accompanying text.
48 See Schlenger, supra note 16; ABA Section on Taxation, supra note 34; Goldfein &
Weiss, supra note 45.
49 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 346 (1981).
50 See note 4 supra.
51 Wolfram, supra note 10, at 281 (citing letter from Professor Anthony G. Amsterdam
to the Grievance Committee of the District of Columbia, quoted in Time, May 13, 1966, at
81).
52 Although guidelines set forth in Revised 346 under "Ethical Considerations" are
directory in nature, this article treats them as mandatory because courts have made no
distinction between mandatory and aspirational rules of ethics in legal malpractice actions.
See cases cited in note 130 infra. See also note 98 infra.
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attorneys in rendering tax shelter opinions. 53
Revised 346 requires an attorney to establish the terms of his
relationship with his offeror-client at the outset, and to make clear
to the client that he requires full disclosure of the structure and
intended operation of the venture upon which he will render an
opinion. 54 The attorney is further directed to require the client to
provide complete access to all relevant information. 55
Revised 346 also incorporates by reference the guidelines

stated in ABA Formal Opinion

335.56

This opinion sets the stan-

dards which attorneys should follow in determining the relevant
facts which underlie the transaction upon which they will issue a tax
shelter opinion.5 7 Under these standards, an attorney first of all
must ask his client for all the relevant facts. If his inquiry produces
facts which are "incomplete in material respect . . . suspect, or
. . .inconsistent either on their face or on the basis of other known

facts," 58 the attorney must then inquire further. The extent of this
inquiry will depend upon the circumstances of each particular case.
If the facts as related by the client are neither inconsistent nor suspect, then the attorney may presume that they are accurate.5 9 In
this regard, Revised 346 emphasizes that the attorney must be particularly cautious when evaluating appraisals and financial projec60
tions relating to tax shelter arrangements.
53 A "tax shelter opinion" for purposes of Revised 346 is defined as "advice by a lawyer
concerning the federal tax law applicable to a tax shelter if the advice is referred to either in
offering materials or in connection with sales promotion efforts directed to persons other
than the client who engages the lawyer to give advice." Revised 346, supra note 4, at 2. A
"tax shelter" for purposes of Revised 346 is an investment which offers significant benefits
to investors in either or both of the following ways: For federal income tax or excise tax
purposes, the investment provides deductions in excess of income, thereby reducing income from other sources in a given year; or, the investment provides credits in excess of the
tax attributable to income in a given year, thereby offsetting taxes from other sources. Id. at
2 n.1.
54 Id. at 5.
55 Id.
56 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 335 (1974)'
[hereinafter cited as Opinion 335].
57 Revised 346, supra note 4, at 5; Opinion 335, supra note 56, at 5.
58 Revised 346, supra note 4, at 5 (quoting Opinion 335, supra note 56, at 5).
59 The essence of [Opinion 335]. . .is that, while a lawyer should make adequate
preparation including inquiry into the relevant facts. . . and while he should not
accept as true that which he should not reasonably believe to be true, he does not
have the responsibility to "audit" the affairs of his client or to assume, without
reasonable cause, that a client's statement of the facts cannot be relied upon.
Revised 346, supra note 4, at 5 (citing Opinion 335, supra note 56, at 3, 5-6).
60 Revised 346, supra note 4, at 5-6.
For instance, where essential underlying information, such as an appraisal or
financial projection, makes little common sense, or where the reputation or expertise of the person who has prepared the appraisal or projection is dubious, further
inquiry clearly is required. Indeed, failure to make further inquiry may result in a
false opinion. [See note 37 supra.] If further inquiry reveals that the appraisal or
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Revised 346 further requires attorneys rendering tax shelter
opinions to relate the law to the actual facts of the transaction to
the extent that the facts are then ascertainable. 6 ' Although he may
assume facts which are not ascertainable at that time, the attorney
must clearly identify those facts as assumed. 6 2 However, in no
event can an attorney issue an opinion which "disclaims responsibility for inquiring as to the accuracy of the facts, fails to analyze
63
critical facts, or discusses purely hypothetical facts."
Revised 346 also imposes a new obligation upon tax shelter
attorneys to make "reasonable inquiries" to ascertain whether the
client has expended a "good faith effort" to comply with laws other
than the tax laws. 64 The attorney must do this even though the client has not asked him to address such issues. 6 5 However, in doing
so, the attorney need not reexamine the conclusions of other counsel. He must simply satisfy himself that the client obtained compe66
tent professional advice on those issues.
Perhaps the most important requirement of Revised 346 is that
the attorney must take reasonable steps to ensure that either he or
other counsel has considered all material 67 federal income and excise tax issues. 68 If an issue involves "a reasonable possibility that
the [IRS] will challenge the tax effect proposed in the offering
materials," then the attorney must address such an issue "fully and
fairly." 6 9 If other professionals are considering the same material
tax issues, the attorney must review their written advice and take
steps to ensure that "the division of responsibility as to the issues is
clear and. . . that all material tax issues will be considered. . . in
accordance with the standards" of Revised 346.70 Should the attorney
find that no one has adequately addressed an issue which the IRS
may contest, he must then inform the client and the other counsel
projection is reasonably well supported and complete, the lawyer is justified in
relying upon material facts which the underlying information supports.
Id.
61 Id. at 6.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 A "material tax issue" for purposes of Revised 346 is one which would have a "significant effect in sheltering from federal taxes income from other sources by providing deductions in excess of the income from the tax shelter investment in any year or tax credits
which will offset tax liabilities in excess of the tax attributable to the tax shelter investment
in any year." Id. The attorney determines what is material by making a good faith analysis
of information then available. Id.
68 Id. at 7.
69 Id.
70 Id. (emphasis added).
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of that fact. 7 ' Furthermore, he must refuse to provide an opinion
72
until the matter is corrected.
In addition, the attorney must state his opinion as to the probable outcome of each material tax issue.7 3 However, he need not do
this if in good faith he cannot make that judgment. 7 4 The attorney
must also provide an overall evaluation as to the extent to which
"tax benefits, in the aggregate, which are a significant feature of the
investment to the typical investor, are likely to be realized." 75 Revised 346 assumes that only in "rare" instances will an attorney be
unable to make a good faith overall evaluation of the potential benefits. 76 In these instances, Revised 346 requires a full explanation
77
as to why the attorney could not make this evaluation.
Where the attorney's evaluation reveals that the tax sheltering
effect is dubious, Revised 346 permits tax shelter opinions which
conclude that clients will probably not realize significant tax benefits. 78 However, the attorney must clearly state and prominently

note this conclusion in the offering materials. 79 The attorney must
be especially careful not to mislead investors when he issues a nega80
tive opinion.
Finally, Revised 346 also requires that the offering materials
represent the true nature and full extent of the tax shelter opinion. 8 1 If the attorney cannot agree with the client over the extent of
this disclosure, he is under an ethical duty to withdraw from em82
ployment and not issue the opinion.
71

Id.

Id. "The lawyer also should assure that his own opinion identifies clearly its limited
nature, if the lawyer is not retained to consider all of the material tax issues." Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 8.
76 Id. "This impossibility may occur where, for example, the most significant tax benefits are predicated upon a newly enacted Code provision where there are no regulations and
the legislative history is obscure." Id.
77 Id. The attorney must also provide "full disclosure in the offering materials of the
assumptions and risks which the investors must evaluate." Id.
78 Id. These are referred to as "negative conclusions."
79 Id. The continued usefulness of negative or reasonable basis opinions, see note 40
supra, is doubtful because they no longer insulate investors from penalties. See LeDuc, supra
note 23, at 369-74. Indeed, an attorney issuing such opinions, which result in the imposition of penalties on investors, is per se negligent.
80 Revised 346, supra note 4, at 8-9.
72

81

82

Id.

If the lawyer disagrees with the client over the extent of disclosure made in the
offering materials or over other matters necessary to satisfy the lawyer's ethical
responsibilities as expressed in [Revised 346], and the disagreement cannot be
resolved, the lawyer should withdraw from employment and not issue an opinion.

Id. at 9.
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III.

Applicability of Revised 346 in Tax Shelter
Malpractice Actions
A.

Overview of Legal Malpractice

Legal malpractice occurs when an attorney fails to use such
skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise in the performance of their clients' work.8 3 In any legal malpractice action, the plaintiff must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the attorney owes
him a duty of care, that the duty was breached by the attorney's
failure to use reasonable care and skill, and that the breach of the
84
duty was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages.
In recent years dissatisfied clients and third party beneficiaries
have brought an increasingly large number of legal malpractice actions against attorneys.8 5 One commentator has remarked that the
"increasing incidence of recoveries against attorneys for malpractice" constitutes a "legal revolution." 8 6 In addition to actions
against attorneys for simple negligence, these legal malpractice actions are often cast in terms of breach of fiduciary duty, breach of
87
express or implied contract, and fraud.
B.

The Duty of Care Owed to Investors Under Revised 346

1. The Traditional Rule
An attorney is liable for legal malpractice only to those to whom
he owes a duty of care. 8 8 Traditionally, courts held that an attorney
owed a duty only to those to whom he was in privity-namely, his
client.8 9 As a result, the widely accepted rule was that a non-client
investor could not maintain a cause of action against a professional
for his negligence in structuring an investment or in rendering an
opinion to a client upon which the investor relied. This rule was
83 See generally 7A C.J.S. Attorney-Client § 255 (1980). See also W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF
TORTS 161-62 (4th ed. 1971).
84 Burrell, Legal Malpractice of the Tax Attorney, 34 TAX EXECUTIVE 259 (1982). For an
overview of legal malpractice, see D. MEISELMAN, ATrORNEY MALPRACTICE: LAW AND PROCEDURE Chapters 1-4 (1980).
85 Dahlquist, supra note 10, at 1. From 1970 to 1975 the number of successful malpractice claims against attorneys increased by 25%. Also, the size of claims recovered increased
by one-third from 1965 to 1975. Id.

86 Wolfram, supra note 10, at 289.
87 Burrell, supra note 84, at 260. Some courts treat breach of fiduciary duty as a separate cause of action from legal malpractice. See, e.g., Fielding v. Brebbia, 399 F.2d 103 (D.C.
Cir. 1968).
88 See Gaudineer, supra note 10, at 110; 7A CJ.S. Attorney-Client § 142 (1980). See also
Note, Attorney's Liability to Third Partiesfor Malpractice: The GrowingAcceptance of Liability in the
Absence of Privity, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 48 (1981).
89 See Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879).
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announced in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche. 90
Courts have since steadily eroded the rule announced in Ultramares and some have actually erased its influence in certain welldefined situations. 9 1 The modem trend holds that an action by a
third party will lie against an attorney where the performance of the
latter'sservices are intended to affect the thirdparty, the harm is foreseeable, a
close connection exists between the attorney's conduct and the harm suffered,
the blame is on the attorney, and the policy of the jurisdiction is to prevent
future harm of a similar nature.92 Often these cases involve the issuance of opinion letters by attorneys. 93 Thus, the established trend
90 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). In Ultramares, a firm of accountants negligently
prepared a report on its client's financial status showing the company to be in sound financial condition when in fact it was insolvent. Id. at 175, 174 N.E. at 442. Although the
accountants knew that the report would be shown by the company in the ordinary course of
its business to banks, creditors, shareholders, and other third parties, it did not know the
frequency with which it would be used nor to whom it would be shown. Id., 174 N.E. at
442. Relying on the report, the plaintiff loaned money to the company and shortly thereafter the company was declared bankrupt. Id., 174 N.E. at 442. The plaintiff who was injured
as a result of the company's insolvency sued the accountants for negligence and fraud. Id.,
174 N.E. at 442. The court dismissed the cause of action for negligence, concluding that
the accountants did not owe a dute of care to third party, non-client investors:
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to detect
a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose accountants
to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. The hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so extreme
as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the implication of a duty that
exposes to these consequences.
Id. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444.
91 See, e.g., White v. Guarente, 43 N.Y.2d 356, 372 N.E.2d 315 (1977) (accountants retained by a limited partnership to perform audit and tax return services held liable to a
group of limited partners for their negligence in the execution of their services). See also
Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969). See generally Note, supra note 88; Annot., 45
A.L.R.3d 1181 (1972).
92 See Donald v. Garry, 19 Cal. App. 3d 769, 97 Cal. Rptr. 191 (1971) (attorney representing a collection agency held liable to a creditor whose action was dismissed because of
the attorney's failure to diligently prosecute the agency's claim); Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d
583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961) (attorney owed a duty of care to beneficiaries
of a will which failed because the will, as drafted, violated the rule against perpetuities);
accord Biankaja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958); Guy v. Liederbach, 279 Pa.
Super. 543, 421 A.2d 333 (1980).
93 See, e.g., Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 57 Cal. App. 3d 104, 128
Cal. Rptr. 901 (1976) (attorney held liable to a third party lender for his incorrect opinion
of a partnership's status where the opinion was rendered for the purpose of influencing the
lender); Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335, 556 P.2d 737, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976)
(attorney not liable to a purchaser of stock where the purchaser was not the intended beneficiary of the attorney's negligent advice to the seller); accord United Leasing Corp. v. Miller,
263 S.E.2d 313 (N.C. App. 1980).
In Reamer v. Kessler, 233 Md. 311, 196 A.2d 896 (1964), an attorney was held liable to
third party lenders where he was retained to organize two corporations and to seek loans
for them to be secured by construction equipment which the client was to transfer to the
corporations. In each instance, the lenders received a certificate from the attorney that the
borrowing corporation had good title to the equipment which was being used as security
for the two loans. The attorney in issuing the certificates merely relied upon his client's
representation that he had good title. He did not make an independent investigation. Had
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firmly supports an attorney's direct liability to investors for his negligent preparation of a tax shelter opinion.
2.

Revised 346 Creates a Duty of Care to Investors

Revised 346 explicitly recognizes that an attorney's role in preparing a tax shelter opinion is that of an advisor9 4 and it clearly implies that an attorney who fails to exercise reasonable care in the
performance of this task should be liable to third party investors:
The Proposed Model Rules specifically recognize the ethical considerations applicable where a lawyer undertakes an evaluation for the use of third persons other than a client. These
third persons have an interest in the integrity of the evaluation.
The legal duty of the lawyer therefore "goes beyond
the obliga'9 5
tions a lawyer normally has to third persons.
Revised 346 repeatedly emphasizes the necessity of protecting
investors. 9 6 Indeed, the existence of third party reliance defines the
tax shelters to which Revised 346 applies. A "tax shelter opinion"
(for purposes of Revised 346) is that which is "directed to persons
other than the client who engage[d] the lawyer to . . . give advice. . . . [T]he term does not . . . include rendering services
' '9 7
solely to the offeror.
Thus, by its own terms, Revised 346 imposes a duty of care on
he done so, he would have discovered that the equipment was in fact owned by third persons. In this regard note that Revised 346 permits an attorney to accept his client's representation of facts unless "any of the alleged facts, or the alleged facts taken as a whole, are
incomplete in a material respect; or are suspect; or are inconsistent; or either on their face
or on the basis of other known facts are open to question." See notes 58-60 supra and
accompanying text.
94 The lawyer rendering a tax shelter opinion which he knows will be relied upon
by third persons, however, functions more as an advisor than as an advocate ....
Because third persons may rely on the advice of the lawyer who gives a tax
shelter opinion, the principles announced in A.B.A. Formal Opinion 314 have little, if any, application.
Revised 346, supra note 4, at 4. See also text accompanying notes 174-81 infra.
95 Revised 346, supra note 4, at 4 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
2.3 at 117 (ABA Comm'n on Evaluation of Professional Standards, Proposed Final Draft,
May 30, 1981)).
96 See, e.g., Revised 346, supra note 4, at 1:
The promoter of the offering may depend upon the recommendations of the lawyer in structuring the venture and often publishes the opinion with the offering
materials or uses the lawyer's name in connection with sales promotion efforts.
The offerees may be expected to rely upon the tax shelter opinion in determining
whether to invest in the venture. It is often uneconomic for the individual offeree
to pay for a separate tax analysis of the offering because of the relatively small sum
each offeree may invest.
97 Revised 346, supra note 4, at 2 (emphasis added). However, advice to an offeror does
constitute a "tax shelter opinion" if the name of the lawyer or the fact that a lawyer has
rendered an opinion is mentioned in the offering materials or in the sales promotion efforts. Id. See also note 53 supra.
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attorneys in favor of investors. 9 8 Nevertheless, this does not mean
that courts will recognize Revised 346 as authority in legal malpractice cases between an attorney and such an investor. Although no
court has specifically addressed the issue, we can draw some conclusions by examining the treatment accorded other rules of ethics
in imposing legal duties on attorneys.
3.

Use of Ethics to Define Those to Whom Attorneys
Owe a Duty of Care

Although many courts have consistently rejected the use of
ethics in defining the scope of legal duties which attorneys owe to
non-clients, 9 9 these cases appear to be mere affirmations of the
long established rule that an attorney does not owe a duty of care to
an adverse party, rather than a rejection of third party liability itself. 10 0 A careful review of these cases suggests that instead of re98 "[T]he lawyer who issues a tax shelter opinion should follow ... the Ethical Considerations of the Model Code." Revised 346, supra note 4, at 3. Revised 346 also points out
that the Model Rules impose a duty in favor of tax shelter investors on an attorney making
an evaluation. Id. at 4. Third persons have an interest in the integrity of the evaluation.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 95, at 117.
99 See, e.g., Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763, 770 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (court rejected use of ethical standards "[r]egardless of the merit[s] of such [a] contention"). In
Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Iowa 1978), af'd, 590 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1983),
an attorney brought an unsuccessful medical malpractice action against a physician. The
physician then sued the attorney for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, negligent
practice of law, failure to comply with the Code of Professional Responsibility, and conspiracy. The court rejected the physician's argument that a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, like a violation of a statute, constitutes negligence per se. 447 F.
Supp. at 1383. In so holding, the court stated:
Violation of the Code of Professional Ethics is not tantamount to a tortious act,
particularly with regard to liability to a non-client. Though Canon 7 does speak of
a duty "to the legal system" to stay within the bounds of the law when representing clients, it does not create a private cause of action.
Id. See also Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902 (Iowa 1978); Nelson v. Miller, 227 Kan. 271,
607 P.2d 438 (1980); Martin v. Trevino, supra; Ayyildiz v. Kidd, 220 Va. 1080, 266 S.E.2d
108 (1980).
100 In Ayyildiz v. Kidd, 220 Va. 1080, 266 S.E.2d 108 (1980), the court, citing Brody v.
Ruby, supra note 99, noted that:
In other states inroads have been made in the privity doctrine as it pertains to
legal malpractice, but where these inroads have occurred, the third party has been a
direct and intended beneficiary of the lawyer's services. An adverse party does not stand in
this position.
Id. at 1086, 266 S.E.2d at 113 (emphasis added). On the other hand, the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (MRPC) contain a disclaimer which discourages use of the MRPC as a
reference for defining legal duties in civil litigation:
The fact that a Rule is ajust basis for a lawyer's self-assessment, or for sanctioning
a lawyer under the administration of a disciplinary authority, does not imply that
an antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transaction has standing to seek enforcement of the Rule. Accordingly, nothing in the rules should be deemed to augment
any substantial legal duty of lawyers or extra disciplinary consequences of violating
such a duty.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (1980) (emphasis added).

If adverse
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jecting the theory, courts will hold that ethical standards may define
the legal duties that an attorney owes to nonadverse third parties.
In Nelson v. Miller,t0 t a physician, who had prevailed in a medical malpractice action, sued his former adversaries' attorneys for
malicious prosecution and negligence. He sought to establish liability based upon 'violations of disciplinary rules prohibiting the filing of frivolous lawsuits and those designed merely to harass or
maliciously injure another.10 2 The court rejected the argument that
a breach of those rules gave rise to a cause of action against an
adversary attorney.' 0 3 However, the court recognized that a cause
of action normally does exist for non-clients in situations involving
foreseeable injury to third party beneficiaries of an attorney's services.10 4 This is precisely the situation which exists when an attorney
issues tax shelter opinions for the benefit of prospective investors.
Moreover, the Nelson court would probably consider Revised 346 in
evaluating the standards within the profession.105
In a factually similar case, Brody v. Rudy, 10 6 the Iowa Supreme
Court rejected the same argument proposed in Nelson v. Miller. But
in doing so, the court made clear that its decision rested on the
critical fact that the third party was the attorney's adversary:
The [lawyer has an] obligation to represent his or her client
zealously within the bounds of the law. . . .The basic adversary
nature of the legal profession. . . must be accompanied by im-

munity from liability for negligence in an action by a successful
adverse litigant.
We hold the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility furnishes no basis for a private cause of action for negligence in the
circumstances of this case.107
The Brody court, citing Ryan v. Kanne,t08 held that "in order
party is substituted for antagonist, the MRPC's disclaimer merely states the general rule.
Moreover, although the MRPC discourages its use in civil litigation, the MRPC contains a
different direction regarding third party beneficiaries:
An evaluation may be performed at the client's direction but for the primary
... benefit of third parties; for example, an opinion ... rendered at the behest of
a vendor for the information of a prospective purchaser ....
When the evaluation is intendedfor the use of a third person, a legal duty to that person
may or may not arise. That legal question is beyond the scope of this rule. However,
since such an evaluation involves a departure from the normal client-lawyer relationship, careful analysis of the situation is required.
Id. at Rule 2.3 comment (evaluation for use by third persons) (emphasis added).
101 227 Kan. 271, 607 P.2d 438 (1980).
102 Id. at 286, 607 P.2d at 450.
103 Id. at 289, 607 P.2d at 451.
104 Id. at 287, 607 P.2d at 450.
105 See text accompanying note 83 supra.
106 267 N.W.2d 902 (Iowa 1978).
107 Id. at 907 (emphasis added).
108 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969). In Ryan the court held that accountants could be lia-
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[for a third person] to proceed successfully in a legal malpractice
action, [he] must be a direct and intended beneficiary of the lawyer's services."' 0 9 A tax shelter investor is just such "a direct and
intended beneficiary of the lawyer's services."
These cases reveal that, in appropriate circumstances, courts
will apply ethical standards to define those persons to whom an attorney owes a duty of care. This should be particularly true where
an application of those standards would yield results consistent
0
with common law. Such a situation existed in Egan v. McNamara."1
In the Egan case, a shareholder entered into a buy-sell agreement
with his corporation and other shareholders, including the corporation's attorney."' The agreement provided that the corporation
would purchase all the common stock of each shareholder upon his
death in accordance with a stated formula." 12 The shareholder died
and the corporation purchased his shares as provided by the agreement. However, the executor of the shareholder's estate was unsatisfied with the results, and sued to rescind the agreement on the
grounds that the corporation's attorney had breached a fiduciary
duty owed to the shareholder. 1 3 The court rejected the argument
because an analysis of the jurisdiction's code of ethics revealed that,
as a representative of the corporation, the attorney owed a duty
only to that entity and not to the shareholder."14 Moreover, the
"result under the Code [of Ethics was] wholly consistent with rele115
vant case law."
Although there is admittedly little authority on point, the
theory that rules of ethics may define those to whom an attorney
owes a duty of care is sound. Clearly, Revised 346 attempts to impose such a duty on attorneys for the benefit of tax shelter investors. Moreover, this result is entirely consistent with the
ble to a third party whom they knew intended to rely upon a financial statement which they
negligently prepared. Id. at 406. But see Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174
N.E. 441 (1931); note 90 supra.
109 267 N.W.2d at 906.
110 467 A.2d 733 (D.C. 1983).
111 Id. at 737.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 737-38. The executor argued that the duty running from the corporation's
attorney to the shareholder was based either upon an attorney-client relationship or upon a
relationship of trust between two stockholders in a close corporation. Id. at 738.
114 Id. at 738.
115 Id. at 739. The court was referring to Fielding v. Brebbia, 479 F.2d 195 (D.C. Cir.
1973). The court there held that "[tihe corporation is the client.. . [and] business confidences of business partners lack the protection of professional privilege." Id. at 198. The
Egan court went on to analogize to the Fielding facts by noting that in Egan the attorney did
not receive separate compensation for the legal services rendered to the shareholder and
that the services had no bearing upon the agreement. 467 A.2d at 739. The court concluded that Fielding did not err by rejecting the suggestion of an attorney-client relationship. Id.

1986]

TAX SHELTER MALPRACTICE

developing trend in case law. 16 Therefore, at least in the tax shelter area, an attorney's liability to investors should prove
indisputable.
C.

Use of Ethics to Define the Standard of Care
in Legal MalpracticeActions

Even if courts reject the independent authority of Revised 346
to establish that tax shelter attorneys have legal duties for malpractice which accrue to tax shelter investors, Revised 346 will still serve
as compelling support for the conclusion that such a duty should
exist under common law."17
Although the Model Rules of Professional Conduct "simply
provide a framework for the ethical practice of law," 118 many have
accepted the persuasive argument that courts should use these
rules more extensively. 1 9 Unsurprisingly, courts have consistently
referred to rules of ethics in formulating procedural rules 120 and in
cases involving disgorgement of fees,' 21 rescission of contract, 122
and recovery of debt. 123 Litigants have also used rules of ethics in
criminal cases to suppress evidence, 124 to request a new trial,' 25 and
116 See notes 100-09 supra and accompanying text.
117 The use of ethics to define the standard of care to which an attorney should be held
responsible has received much more acceptance, see text accompanying notes 118-42 infra,
than their use in defining those to whom an attorney owes a duty of care. This development is largely attributable to the fact that in most cases involving the latter use, adverse
parties tried to use ethics to create a cause of action in their favor and courts have steadfastly
refused to extend an attorney's liability to them. See notes 100-09 supra and accompanying
text. Also, as in Egan v. McNamara, 467 A.2d 733 (D.C. 1983), resort to rules of ethics to
define those to whom an attorney owes a duty of care would in most instances produce the
same results as an analysis of the common law. Therefore, reference to rules of ethics in
these cases, although helpful, may be unnecessary.
118 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr, supra note 100, at Preamble.
119 See Wolfram, supra note 10, at 286-95. For an argument against the use of the rules
of ethics, see Comment, The Code of Professional Responsibility in Attorney Malpractice: Illinois
Attorneys Have a Duty to Inform Clients of an Intent to Settle, 30 DEPAuLL. REv. 499 (1981).
120 Cherney v. Moody, 413 So. 2d 866 (Fla. App. 1982); Haynes v. First National State
Bank, 87 NJ. 163, 432 A.2d 890 (1981).
121 In re Eastern Super Litigation, 697 F.2d 524 (3d Cir. 1982); Financial General Bankshares, Inc. v. Metzger, 523 F. Supp. 744 (D.D.C. 1981) (breach of ethical rules required
disgorgement of fees), vacated, 680 F.2d 768 (D.C. Cir. 1982). But see Delano v. Kitch, 663
F.2d 990, 998 n.9 (10th Cir. 1981) (court declined to "inject issue of whether the Code [of
Professional Responsibility] should serve as the basis for private litigation into this action").
See also Knighten v. Knighten, 447 So. 2d 534, 543 (La. App. 1984) (ethical standards used
to measure the reasonableness of a fee).
122 Rode v. Branca, 481 F. Supp. 808, 810-11 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Egan v. McNamara, 467
A.2d 733 (D.C. 1983).
123 O'Dowd v.Johnson, 666 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
124 See, e.g., United States v. Jamil, 546 F. Supp. 646 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd, 707 F.2d
638, 645-46 (2d Cir. 1983) (court accepted argument that violations of ethics can justify

suppression of evidence but found that no violations had occurred).
125 State v. Dean, 67 Wis. 2d 513, 227 N.W.2d 712 (1975).
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to assert ineffective assistance of counsel.' 2 6 Furthermore, courts
have applied these rules extensively in disqualifying opposing
counsel, 2 7 notwithstanding an express code prohibition against
their use as a "procedural weapon" against adversaries. 28 Incredibly, one jurisdiction has gone so far as to apply the lawyer's code of
29
ethics to dentists in a dental malpractice action.'
The most extensive use of rules of ethics occurs in actions for
breach of fiduciary duty and legal malpractice.13 0 Courts follow this
course despite the Code's disclaimer' 3 1 that it is not intended to be
used in civil litigation 32 and, in some cases, the active opposition to
its use by the bar. 3 3 Some courts, however, have accepted the
Code's disclaimer as dispositive. 134 But more courts have not
126 Summers v. Thompson, 444 F. Supp. 312 (M.D. Tenn. 1977). See also Gaudineer,
supra note 10, at 102-06.
127 Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976); International Electronics Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1975); Lee v. Todd, 555 F. Supp. 628
(W.D. Tenn. 1982); Griesemer v. Retail Store Employees Union Local 1393, 482 F. Supp.
312 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
128

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 100, at Preamble. See also note

100 supra.
129 Porubiansky v. Emory University, 156 Ga. App. 602, 610 n.2, 275 S.E.2d 163, 169
n.2 (1980) (court found exculpatory clause void as against public policy noting that the
state code of ethics prohibited attorneys from limiting their liability to clients, stating: "We
see no reason why other professionals, such as dentists, should not be held to a similar
standard."), aff'd, 248 Ga. 391, 282 S.E.2d 903 (1981).
130 See, e.g., McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 983
(1981); Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980); Van
Horn Lodge, Inc. v. White, 627 P.2d 641 (Alaska 1981) (Rabinowitz, C.J., dissenting);
Kirsch v. Duryea, 21 Cal. 3d 303, 578 P.2d 935, 146 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1978); Lysick v.
Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968); Egan v. McNamara, 467 A.2d 733
(D.C. 1985); Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund & Belom, 81 Ill.
2d 201, 407
N.E.2d 47 (1980); Crest Inv. Trust, Inc. v. Comstock, 23 Md. App. 280, 327 A.2d 891
(1974); DiPiero v. Goodman, 14 Mass. App. 929, 436 N.E.2d 998 (1982), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1029 (1983); Lipton v. Boesky, 110 Mich. App. 589, 313 N.W.2d 163 (1981); Lieberman v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 84 N.J. 325, 419 A.2d 417 (1980); George v. Caton, 93
N.M. 370, 600 P.2d 822 (1979); Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Holt, 36 N.C. App. 284, 244
S.E.2d 177 (1978); McInnis v. Hyatt Legal Services, 10 Ohio St. 3d 112, 461 N.E.2d 1295
(1984); Lott v. Ayres, 611 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); Ortiz v. Barrett, 222 Va. 118,
278 S.E.2d 833 (1981); Hawkins v. King County, 24 Wash. App. 338, 602 P.2d 361 (1979);
Hansen v. Wightman, 14 Wash. App. 78, 538 P.2d 1238 (1975).
131 See notes 100 and 128 supra and accompanying text.
132 "We recognize that the Code of Professional Responsibility 'does not undertake to
define standards for civil liability of lawyers for professional conduct'

. . .

. Nevertheless, it

certainly constitutes some evidence of the standards required of attorneys." Woodruff v.
Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924, 936 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980).
133 See, e.g., Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund & Belom, 81 Ill.
2d 201, 407
N.E.2d 47 (1980) (court found attorney liable for failure to disclose to his client his intent
to settle). The Illinois Defense Counsel and Illinois State Bar Association participated in
the case as amici curiae urging that "the appellate court erred in implying that proof of a
violation of the canons or disciplinary rules of the American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility established a per se basis for imposing liability on an attorney in a
malpractice action." Id. at 204, 407 N.E.2d at 48.
134 See, e.g., Greening v. Klamen, 652 S.W.2d 730, 734 (Mo. App. 1983).
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found the disclaimer compelling.13 5 This is undoubtedly because
the Code clearly enunciates the conduct expected of attorneys and
because much of its language sounds in negligence.' 3 6 As such, it is
a well-articulated reference point, too irresistible to ignore. Furthermore, these courts recognize the common sense notion that because "[e]very lawyer is responsible for observance of [these]
[r]ules,"' 3 7 they are designed to protect the public interest. Thus,
there is no good reason why the rules should not also provide the
basic evaluation tools for courts which judge the quality of an attorney's performance.
Consider the reasoning of the court in Lipton v. Boesky.' 38 In
rejecting a defendant attorney's argument that his alleged breach of
several disciplinary rules was not actionable, the court stated:
The Code of Professional Responsibility is a standard of
practice for attorneys which expresses in general terms the standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers in their relationships with the public, the legal system, and the legal
profession. Holding a specific client unable to rely on the same
standards in his professional relations with his own attorney
would be patently unfair. We hold that, as with statutes, 3a9violation of the Code is rebuttable evidence of malpractice.'
This reasoning is compelling.
While some courts have avoided ruling on the issue, 140 others
have gone so far as to hold that a plaintiffs complaint in a legal
malpractice action failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted where the complaint failed to allege all matters necessary
4
to constitute a breach of a disciplinary rule.' '
135 See notes 130 and 132 supra.
136 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 100, at Rule 1.1
(competence).
137 Id. at Preamble.
138 110 Mich. App. 589, 313 N.W.2d 163 (1981).
139 Id. at 597-98, 313 N.W.2d at 166-67 (citation omitted).
140 Saul v. Blumenfeld, 445 A.2d 613 (D.C. 1982) (court in a legal malpractice action
failed to rule on appellant's claim that the trial court erred in refusing to allow evidence
based upon the Code of Professional Responsibility). In Johnson v.Jones, 103 Idaho 702,
652 P.2d 650 (1982), the court stated:
The more difficult question is whether a cause of action for legal malpractice...
[may arise from] the failure of [an] attorney [in] fulfill[ing] fiduciary responsibilities imposed by the Code of Professional Conduct. Without foreclosing the possibility that such a cause of action might be maintained in some circumstances, we
hold that the breach. . . alleged in this case did not serve as the basis for an action
for legal malpractice.
Id. at 704, 652 P.2d at 652 (emphasis in original). See also Citizens State Bank of Dickinson
v. Shapiro, 575 S.W.2d 375, 386 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
141 See, e.g., Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Holt, 36 N.C. App. 284, 288, 244 S.E.2d 177, 182
(1978) (complaint that attorney improperly represented multiple parties failed to state a
valid claim where it was not alleged that the attorney failed to disclose his multiple representation as required by the state code of ethics).
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The use of Revised 346 in tax shelter malpractice cases will
merely reflect this well-reasoned application of ethics in defining an
attorney's duty of care in general legal malpractice actions. Courts
which have accepted the general principle have not only referred to
disciplinary rules and ethical considerations within the Code, they
also have utilized formal ethics opinions of the ABA and of their
respective state bar organizations. 14 2 Thus, there is sufficient authority to warrant reference to Revised 346 for guidance in determining the standards required of attorneys in legal malpractice
cases involving failed tax shelters.
IV.

Ramifications of the Application of Revised 346
A.

Proof of Applicable Ethical Standards

Ordinarily, in legal malpractice actions, plaintiffs must use expert witnesses to testify as to the degree of care and skill demanded
in the particular situation. 143 An exception to this rule exists where
the alleged negligence of the attorney is so obvious that it is within
44
the range of experience and understanding of nonprofessionals.1
But where the case involves the attorney's failure to observe accepted standards in issuing a tax shelter opinion, this exception
does not apply. Here, in order to establish a prima facie case of
malpractice, the plaintiff must provide expert testimony by an attorney who has knowledge of tax shelter practice and the ethical stan145
dards which apply.
The presence of legal ethics experts in the courtroom has increased as courts grow more receptive to the use of the rules of
ethics as evidence of the applicable standard of care for attorneys. 14 6 Such acceptance involves close scrutiny of the expert's testimony. Thus, in Kirsch v. Duryea,t 4 7 for example, where the
plaintiff's expert testified that the defendant-attorney was negligent
142 See Financial General Bankshares, Inc. v. Metzger, 523 F. Supp. 744 (D.D.C. 1981);
Storm Drilling Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Corp., 386 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. La. 1974); Johnson v.
Jones, 103 Idaho 202, 652 P.2d 650 (1982); Lieberman v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 84
N.J. 325, 419 A.2d 417 (1980).
143 D. MEISELMAN, supra note 84, at 149-55.
144 See, e.g., Sorenson v. Fio Rito, 90 111. App. 3d 368, 45 Ill. Dec. 714, 413 N.E.2d 47
(1980).
145 See D. MEISELMAN, supra note 84, at 153-54.
146 See Kirsch v. Duryea, 21 Cal. 3d 303, 578 P.2d 935, 146 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1978) (court
expressly rejected ethics expert's testimony as it was inconsistent with the ABA and state
bar rules of ethics); DiPiero v. Goodman, 14 Mass. App. 929, 436 N.E.2d 998 (1982) (expert's testimony of breach of ethics if properly formulated would have been sufficient in law
to support a finding of malpractice). See also Raine v. Drasin, 621 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1981)
(malicious prosecution and abuse of process actions in which a deposition of a law professor and member of the Ethics Committee of the Louisville Bar Association was read to the
jury).
147 21 Cal. 3d 303, 578 P.2d 935, 146 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1978).
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in not seeking an immediate, nonconsensual withdrawal (when he
concluded that the plaintiff's original case lacked merit), the California Supreme Court rejected such testimony because it was contrary to the ABA's disciplinary rules (which required the attorney to
take all reasonable steps to avoid prejudicing his client's rights prior
148
to withdrawal).
Similar reasoning, in the context of a legal malpractice action
arising out of the issuance of a tax shelter opinion, could lead a
court to reject an expert's opinion as to the standard of care to be
applied in a particular case if it is inconsistent with the requirements of Revised 346. In fact, courts may have to instruct the jury
to choose between experts. In cases of this nature, experts will refer to Revised 346 and opine that the defendant-attorney did (or
did not) comply with its terms (depending on whose behalf the expert testifies). Such conflicting testimony should raise interesting
questions of mixed law and fact. However, the more interesting
area of development will be the extent to which these experts do
disagree-their debate on what Revised 346 actually requires and
how it applies to different factual scenarios. Given the nature of an
expert's role in malpractice actions, disagreement itself appears to
be a certainty.
B.

Impact of Revised 346 on Custom

Evidence of the customary practice in a community is generally
admissible on the question of what standard applies in a legal malpractice action. 14 9 This rule is consistent with the general principles of tort law which measure the conduct of an actor against that
of the other members of his community.150 "Considerations of fairness, a judicial desire to further efficiency by encouraging adherence to readily observable standards, and an instinct to defer to the
general demonstrated proclivities of the group have uniformly persuaded courts to admit evidence of custom and habit as bearing on
the question of due care."' 15
52
However, as demonstrated by Gleason v. Title Guarantee Co.,'
evidence of compliance with customary practice does not guarantee
insulation from liability in a legal malpractice action. In Gleason, an
attorney, retained to examine title to real estate and to verify that
the desired mortgages would not be subordinate to existing mort148 Id. at 311, 578 P.2d at 940, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 223. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-11 1(A)(2) (1977).
149 R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, supra note 1, at 338-40.
150 Wolfram, supra note 10, at 294; see note 83 supra and accompanying text.
151
152

Wolfram, supra note 10, at 294.
300 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1962), reh'g denied, 317 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1963). See also note I

supra and accompanying text.
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gages, 5 3 represented that he had personally reviewed the relevant
records.- 54 Actually, he had merely relied upon incorrect informa55
tion provided to him over the telephone by an abstract company. 1
When his client sued him for legal malpractice, the attorney defended his conduct on the ground that it was customary for attor56
neys in his community to make title certifications in that manner.1
The court rejected his argument, holding that:
While custom provides an important indication of what
constitutes reasonable care and what is negligent, it is not dispositive of the question at issue. All customs are not good customs, and lawyers have no prescriptive right to make knowingly
false statements in the name of custom. . . . We can sympathize
with the defendant in the fact that he is to be heavily penalized
for following the custom while others, perhaps even those who
established the custom, may escape adverse consequences.
Nevertheless, the custom was improper, and its existence cannot
alter [the attorney's] responsibility . ... 157
158
Thus, compliance with customary practice is not dispositive.
While custom may help define the applicable standard of care, it
will not insulate an attorney from liability if a reasonable person
would not follow the custom.' 5 9
Thus, an attorney charged with failing to follow Revised 346
ordinarily could not successfully contend that his conduct was reasonable and not actionable solely because it was in conformance
with the customary practice, the very practice condemned in Revised 346. Instead the attorney would also have to show that, given
the requirements of Revised 346, the custom still states the standards
which a reasonable person would follow.
This result is not unfair. The terms of Revised 346 are not
unduly burdensome or unreasonable. Furthermore, extensive dis60
cussion of the need to correct unacceptable practices in this area
places attorneys on notice that the government, the bar, and the
public have grown impatient with them; that those who ignore Revised 346 are unnecessarily exposing themselves to liability, and
61
that they are, therefore, undeserving of sympathy.'

153

300 F.2dat 814.

154
155

Id.
Id.

156 Id.
157 Id. (citations omitted). See also text accompanying note 1 supra.
158 See generally 7A C.J.S. Attorney-Client § 254 (1980).
159 R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 1, at 338-40; see text accompanying notes 1-5 supra.
160 See the collection of articles cited in Special Comm. on the Lawyer's Role in Tax
Practice, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, Tax Lawyer's Role in Tax Practice, 36 TAX
LAW. 865, 872 n.31 (1983).
161 See, e.g., Kuehn v. Garcia, 608 F.2d 1143, 1146 (8th Cir. 1979) (attorney found in
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C. Causation
In any legal malpractice action the plaintiff must show that the
attorney's negligent act or omission was the proximate cause of his
damages. 162 In the case of an investor in a failed tax shelter, this
would typically mean that the investor would have to show that he
received the tax shelter opinion, that he read it, that he relied on it
in investing in the shelter, and that the attorney's advice or lack
thereof caused his damages. Since investors commonly rely upon
tax shelter opinions, 163 causation should not present an insurmountable barrier to recovery of damages.
D.

Damages

Tax shelter malpractice cases present no unique damages issues. Damages issues in these cases will usually be resolved by each
jurisdiction's normal civil rules. 164 Typically, tax malpractice damages include attorney's fees, and amounts equal to the assessed
penalties and interest. 165 Additionally, the attorney should compensate the investor for the loss of tax benefits which the investor
66
reasonably expected to derive from the investment.'
breach of ethical rules at a disciplinary hearing may be barred from relitigating his liability
to an investor in a subsequent malpractice suit by collateral estoppel).
162 See D. MEISELMAN, supra note 84, at 40-43. See also text accompanying note 84 supra.
163 Many commentators share the view expressed in the Report of the Executive Committee of the Tax Section, New York State Bar Association Tax Section, supra note 2, at 203:
An indeterminate number of investors in tax shelters are ignorant of the subtleties
involved and are unable to evaluate the complexities of the legal discussion [in the
tax shelter opinion]-if, indeed, they even read it. Many of them probably take
the mere presence of the lawyer's opinion as an indication that the desired tax
benefits will be achieved (even if the opinion is more guarded than that). Other
investors know full well that the shelter is subject to serious question, but assume
that the lawyer's opinion means that the transaction-at least as to the investorprovides a possible reporting position that may prevail if audited.
See also Schlenger, supra note 16, at 179; Johnson v. Jones, 103 Idaho 702, 652 P.2d 650
(1982).
164

R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, supra note 1, at 349.

165 See, e.g., Sorenson v. Fio Rito, 90 Ill. App. 3d 368, 45 Ill. Dec. 714, 413 N.E.2d 47
(1980) (damages awarded in the form of penalties, interest, and attorney's fees caused by
defendant attorney's negligence in failing to file certain inheritance and estate tax forms).
166 Some may think that awarding expectation damages is unwarranted in tax shelter
cases, especially where the plaintiff invested in an abusive tax shelter. However, a careful
analysis reveals that such damages arejustifiable. If the attorney issued a favorable opinion
when a negative opinion was warranted, the investor would have refrained from investing in
this tax shelter; he would, nonetheless, have invested in another which would have, or at
least could have, provided the benefits expected from the first. Thus, since the attorney
was negligent in his appraisal of the first, the investor lost the opportunity and the benefits
which the opportunity entailed.
On the other hand, if the attorney issued a negative opinion instead of a favorable one,
unless the investor refrained from investing in any tax shelter, he should not recover any
expectation damages, or at least none greater than the difference between the first (assuming its benefits were greater) and the one in which he actually invested.
For a thorough analysis of the damages recoverable in legal malpractice cases involving
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Generally, courts do not award punitive damages in legal mal16 7
practice cases in the absence of fraud, malice, or oppression.
However, fraud does exist in cases where an attorney makes statements with reckless or conscious disregard of the truth. 6 8 Some
punitive damages where there is simply
jurisdictions even permit
"gross negligence."' 16 9 Thus, investors should recover punitive
damages against an attorney where the attorney's conduct is an
egregious violation of the disciplinary standards contained in Revised 346, and may recover them for less oppressive conduct.
Revised 346 provides that an attorney issues a false opinion
whenever he "accepts as true the facts the [offeror-client] . . . tells
him, when. . . [he] should know that a further inquiry would disclose.. . [those] facts as untrue."' 170 Furthermore, an attorney who
renders a false opinion' 7 ' is guilty of "conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation" in violation of disciplinary
rules.17 2 Clearly, in these cases it is difficult to dispute the appropriateness of punitive damages.
E. Use of Ethical Rules as a Defense
Ethicai standards have mostly aided plaintiffs who have argued
that a breach of the rules of ethics constitutes legal malpractice.
However, courts have also accepted evidence of compliance with
the rules as evidence of conformance to the applicable standards of
due care. 17 3 Sometimes both sides in a legal malpractice action
have made a case based on the rules of ethics.
Hawkins v. King County' 7 4 provides a final example of the potential uses of ethical standards. In the Hawkins case, the plaintiff advised his court-appointed defense attorney that he wished to be
released on bail pending the disposition of criminal charges against
him.' 75 Prior to the bail hearing, the attorney learned that the
plaintiff was mentally ill and dangerous to others. This information
a breach of ethics, see Lieberman v. Employees Ins. of Wausau, 84 NJ. 325, 341-42, 419
A.2d 417, 426-27 (1980).
167 Stinson v. Feminist Women's Health Center, 416 So. 2d 1183, 1185 (Fla. App.

1982).
168
169

R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 1, at 366.
Welder v. Mercer, 247 Ark. 999, 448 S.W.2d 952 (1972).

170 Revised 346, supra note 4, at 3.
171

See note 37 supra.

172 Revised 346, supra note 4, at 3.
173 See, e.g., Kirsch v. Duryea, 21 Cal. 3d 303, 311, 578 P.2d 935, 940, 146 Cal. Rptr. 218,
223 (1978) (alleged improper "delay in [withdrawing from the case] . . . does not reflect
absence of due care but rather compliance with the [Rules of Professional Responsibility]");
Egan v. McNamara, 467 A.2d 733 (D.C. 1983); First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 165 Ga.
625, 302 S.E.2d 674 (1983).
174 24 Wash. App. 338, 602 P.2d 361 (1979).
175 Id. at 340, 602 P.2d at 363.

1986]

TAX SHELTER MALPRACTICE

came from a psychiatrist who had examined the plaintiff and from
another attorney who had been hired by the plaintiff's mother to
7
assist in having the plaintiff hospitalized or civilly committed.1 6
At the bail hearing, the attorney did not offer the information
and no questions were directed to him in this vein. The plaintiff
was released. 177 Eight days later, the plaintiff assaulted his mother
and attempted suicide by jumping off a bridge. This attempt at selfdestruction resulted in injuries requiring the amputation of both of
his legs. 178
The plaintiff sued the attorney for legal malpractice for failing
to reveal his mental condition to the court in contravention of both
the court's rules and the ethical rule that "a lawyer shall not...
[i]n his representation of a client. . .[c]onceal or knowingly fail to
disclose that which he is required by law to reveal." 1 79 The court
rejected the plaintiffs claim, finding that the attorney did not have
to disclose this information and that the attorney's conduct was
proper because of his duty of loyalty and his ethical duty to "advo80
cate zealously his client's interests" as required by the Code.
Significantly, the tax shelter attorney is not an advocate,' 8 ' and,
therefore, he should not be able to make the same defense.
V. Conclusion
The use of ethics to measure an attorney's liability for legal
malpractice is a developing but well-entrenched practice. Revised
346 is the single most authoritative statement on accepted professional standards in the area of tax shelter opinions. Therefore,
courts will inevitably resort to Revised 346. Although some courts
may reject the argument that Revised 346 sets the definitive standard, or that it constitutes evidence of the standard of care in this
area, it is likely that attorneys will nevertheless adhere to Revised
346's guidelines either voluntarily or because they will fear its potential use in legal malpractice actions. Consequently, the guidelines of Revised 346 should eventually evolve into customary
practice, and, therefore, ultimately set the standards for measuring
an attorney's performance in rendering a tax shelter opinion.
Tax shelter attorneys stand forewarned. The mere existence of
Revised 346 has alerted the tax bar to particular problems, such as
overvaluation, in the tax shelter area. Accordingly, those who fail
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 342, 602 P.2d at 363 (citing MODEL CODE
7-102(A)(3) (1976)).
180 24 Wash. App. at 343, 602 P.2d at 364.
181 See note 94 supra and accompanying text.
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to exercise extra caution in the areas which Revised 346 addresses
cannot complain when courts apply its standards to find them liable
for abusive tax shelter opinions. Such an attorney is manifestly at
fault.

